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DISCUSSION OF: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AN
ARCHEOLOGICAL FIND
By Stephen M. Stigler
University of Chicago
Statistics is the science of uncertainty, and it should be capable of helping
to address even hard to quantify problems. Indeed, the very attempt to quan-
tify may itself shed light and understanding, and can often lead to better
articulation of even qualitative evidential arguments. Yet, when statistical
ideas are used in areas where wide segments of the population hold strongly
divided passionate views, areas such religion or politics, the entry of statis-
tics into the discussion is seldom accorded a warm and friendly reception.
Instead, the greeting is at best extraordinarily skeptical, with quibbling over
minor points that would be passed by silently in less-contentious studies, and
with inhospitality to even the best of intentions. At worst, the intruder is
burned at the stake or removed from the rolls of the employed, although
such extremes are rarer these days than they were at the time of Giordano
Bruno and Galileo.
Is this resistance rational? Do questions like that confronted in Andrey
Feuerverger’s painstakingly honest study of an archeological find, questions
involving broad public knowledge and wide publicity, require a different
standard of proof than run-of-the mill scientific questions? I think they may
well, for several reasons.
1. The very wide public attention to the area, even before the discovery
of the evidence, changes the way we think of the evidence. For example, the
temptations to persons of unknown identity (even in the distant past) to
fraudulently manufacture evidence must be considered, and the weighing of
potential forms of fraud in any modeling context is a highly vexing question.
2. Even aside from any possible fraud, the conditions surrounding the
arrival of the evidence can legitimately raise questions that would never
arise in more mundane investigations. For example, we are told that, “No
information is available regarding the placement of the various ossuaries
among the kokhim.” But the names involved in this case are so universally
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recognized that it might be argued that the absence of information is in this
case informative, as the dog who did not bark was to Sherlock Holmes. One
might believe that had the ossuaries been arrayed together in a meaningful
order, this would with some probability have been noted, and the lack of
such notation suggests they were not.
3. Francis Galton issued a caution in 1863 for those dealing with small
data sets with uncertain generating mechanisms: “Exercising the right of
occasional suppression and slight modification, it is truly absurd to see how
plastic a limited number of observations become, in the hands of men with
preconceived ideas” (Meteorographica, London: Macmillan, 1863, page 5).
Since occasional suppression and slight modification can be a part of sound
statistical analysis, it is easy to overlook this potential bias, for it will not
always be obviously present or consciously operating in a deceptive way.
I commend Andrey Feuerverger for undertaking this investigation. That
it may be greeted skeptically is no reflection upon him, only upon the nature
of the question he considers. Some of the assumptions he forthrightly makes,
such as the independent assignment of names in families, may not survive
later scrutiny. But in the face of all these difficulties, his carefully qualified
analysis reminds us that addressing a question is not the same as resolving
it, and that issues of wide general interest where prior opinions are sharply
divided present novel problems of statistical formulation. I look forward to
the ensuing dialogue, which will hopefully have greater focus because of the
pains Feuerverger has taken to frame and present the issues.
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